Crisis And The Democracy In Somaliland

Those who are well familiar with the Somaliland democratic process perfectly know that we are not still democrats, but we are trying to build a democratic society. The way we go about this has been, and still is, by using mixture of clan, Islamic and limited democratic methodologies to choose our leaders and to settle our conflicts, and we call these democratic actions, though it is far from democracy.
In connection to this, the argument that Abdirahman Aw Ali and his supporters saying that Burao Kulmiye conference were not democratic loses its validity and credibility in Somaliland political context.
I can quote one main event, during the election of the parliamentary speakers. The Guurti realized the political system of the country tilts decisively to the ruling party, UDUB if the speakers of the parliament also went to the ruling party. The Guurti settled with the well-known formula, by allowing the opposition parties to have had the speaker and its two deputies (Shir-gudoonka).
That day I remember by asking the wise man of the Guurti, H. Abdirkarin (Abdi Warabe) what legal basis of this compromise was based. He said to me, “We did not refer too much on legal basis, but we refer to the political wisdom “xikma” of Somaliland . Because we thought if “shir-gudoonka” also goes to the ruling party, the government will have too much power.” (Xisbu xaakimku haday taa ku darsadaan waxay helayaan doobi buuxa, qolada mucaaridka ahina doobi madhan, markaa taasi nalama aha wax wanaagsan.)

Dr. Mohamed-Rashid Sh. Hassan e-mail: rashid108@hotmail.com

The Fall Of Mbeki

Thursday, September 25, 2008

It is hard to think of a more ignominious end for Thabo Mbeki. As deputy to Nelson Mandela and then as president, he has run South Africa since the end of apartheid.
Last Saturday he was "recalled" from the presidency by the National Executive Council of the governing African National Congress and forced to resign. The move followed a series of blunders that have shattered the image of the man once revered as an African Machiavelli, coolly puffing his pipe while outsmarting all before him.
Mbeki's rise through the ranks of the ANC, the party his father Govan Mbeki once led, was meteoric. He often boasted that he was "born into the struggle" for liberation from white oppression. But his ousting was inevitable after he arrogantly overestimated his base within the ANC and failed to be re-elected as party leader last December.
In totting up his domestic legacy, South Africa's impressive growth rates, political stability and widening black economic empowerment will have to be balanced against his failure to tackle the twin epidemics that continue to grip the country - crime and AIDS. Many regard his crackpot views on the disease as contributing to the needless deaths of thousands of South Africans who were unable to gain access to effective treatment.
Throughout his tenure, Mbeki's passion for diplomacy was palpable. He loved the international stage and believed that he alone possessed the skills and vision to recast his beleaguered continent in the eyes of the world. This idea became manifest in his "African renaissance." That one rarely, if ever, hears this term today is emblematic of his dismal record in foreign affairs. The recent deal he brokered in Zimbabwe , which looks increasingly tenuous, should fool no one: Mbeki's legacy as an international statesman is disappointing.
His predecessor's vision that human rights would be the light that guided South Africa's foreign policy, making the country a beacon of hope for the world and for African development, may have been utopian, given the harsh realities of African politics.
Nevertheless, Mbeki inherited an enormous reserve of political capital built up by Nelson Mandela. The country's diversity, its status as the only nuclear power to voluntarily give up its weapons, the lessons of its transformation process, the muscle of its economy - one-third of sub-Saharan Africa's total - all this was an extraordinary foundation on which to build a uniquely African development model.
Mbeki never demonstrated that he possessed a clear understanding of South Africa 's national interest or how to balance ideological considerations and the country's priorities in trade, investment and international politics.
At the United Nations, for example, short-term tactical politicization routinely overshadowed strategic considerations. Instead of leading the African voting bloc, the UN's biggest, on trade access and help to the continent, South Africa blocked UN managerial reform, obstructed the interests of Western powers and maneuvered around tougher action on Burma, Zimbabwe and Iran. None of this did one bit for Africa or Africans.
The anti-imperialistic tenor of Mbeki's foreign policy was understandable, given his background. Less explicable was his failure to apply to Russia and China the same opprobrium he reserved for the West, especially the United States . Whatever the issue, under Mbeki South African opposition to U.S. policies often appeared more reflexive than considered.
For several years, Mbeki tried to encourage President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe down the path of electoral politics. Against all evidence that this was possible in a state disintegrating under hyper-inflation and violent repression, Mbeki doggedly stuck to his plan. His unwillingness to act against Mugabe - to simply even state that what was happening there was wrong - gave succor to Harare 's regime and amplified the crisis.
Did Mbeki misjudge Mugabe? Or did he believe the tyrant's liberation credentials excused all else?
Clearly, Mbeki sought to project himself as a liberator. But it is hard to escape the conclusion that, in seeking to ameliorate the crisis in Zimbabwe , Mbeki was greatly inhibited by his own determination to safeguard the ANC's liberation narrative. His shameful response to criticism of Zimbabwe by outside powers, and their calls for South Africa and other African governments to do more to resolve the crisis, exposed his deep personal sensitivity on questions of race.
If the new administration in Pretoria can unshackle itself from the ANC's inhibitive liberation ethos, Mbeki's departure from office could revitalize South Africa 's standing in world affairs.
Greg Mills heads the Johannesburg-based Brenthurst Foundation and Terence McNamee is with the London-based Royal United Services Institute.

Puntland Pirates - SL Times Newspapaer

Bosaaso, September 27, 2008 (SL Times) –

Piracy has become the most lucrative business in Puntland , Somalia 's north eastern region and safe haven for numerous armed gangs that hijack private and commercial vessels traveling in the waters between Yemen and Somalia for ransom.

In this year, pirates have already collected at least $80 million in ransom payments from ship owners.
It was only yesterday when Puntland pirates announced the release of a Japanese ship after the payment of a $2 million ransom.
Although sources close to the pirates estimate the number of vessels seized this year in the Gulf of Aden and off Puntland to be over 100, however only about a dozen of them had been reported.
Shipping companies are often reluctant to report piracy attacks out of concern for the increase in insurance premium that it would trigger.
But piracy in Puntland is not going to disappear. It has become the easiest way not only become rich but also to climb the social ladder fast.
Punland's piracy industry now employs over 2000 people. But the daring raids on ships are usually carried out by about 500 hardcore pirates who are often organized into groups of 10-15.
Pirates share their spoils with the local community and governing authorities for protection.
The rule is that 20% of the ransom money is invested in purchase of any equipment, weapons and communication devices that may deem necessary improving the efficiency of piracy operations, while 20% is allocated to each of the hosting community and the Puntland authorities. The remaining 40% is divided up among the Hawl-galeyaasha or the people who do the actual piracy attacks in the sea.
The piracy code also requires allocation of generous compensation funds to the families of pirates who are killed or wounded in piracy attacks.
Pirates tend to pay extravagantly for services or for goods to buy loyalty.
A Bosaaso businessman who deals with them said “A pirate buying a cup of teas in a remote coastal village would normally pay 10 times the actual price. If they need an extra AK 47 they would rent it from a villager for $100 for a couple of weeks instead of paying the whole $300 it costs.”
There is no doubt that the adventurous and lavish lifestyle led by the pirates in Puntland has already won admiration and allegiance from local communities.

Somali Leaders

Somali Leaders Use National Funds To ‘Buy Mps': Sources

TFG President Yusuf, Speaker Madobe and PM Nur Adde
BAIDOA, Somalia Sep 24 , 2008 – Somali leaders locked in endless political disputes use public funds to pay members of parliament (MPs) for votes, legislative sources tell Somali news agency Garowe Online.
In July, a political rift arose between Abdillahi Yusuf and Nur “Adde” Hassan Hussein, the President and Prime Minister of the country's UN-endorsed Transitional Federal Government (TFG), respectively.
Somali MPs in the south-central city of Baidoa were deeply embroiled in the conflict, with Yusuf and Nur Adde supporters introducing rival motions.
When the President's supporters in Parliament brought a vote-of-confidence motion against the Prime Minister, Nur Adde's supporters introduced a similar motion against the President.
Somali lawmakers' vote was “on sale” for other critical votes, the sources added, including an accountability motion with Prime Minister Nur Adde's government and a vote on whether or not pro-Yusuf Cabinet ministers could return to their posts.
MPs who did not wish to be named for security-related reasons tell Garowe Online that President Yusuf and Prime Minister Nur Adde invested as much as US$700,000 to buy lawmakers' votes during the recent dispute.
The money is handed directly to Sheikh Adan “Madobe” Mohamed, a former warlord who is now the parliament Speaker, according to our sources.
“Every motion brought into parliament is being secretly supported by TFG leaders, who invest a lot of money to buy MPs,” said a lawmaker.
Meanwhile, President Yusuf referred Speaker Madobe's September 23 letter rejecting the return of 10 Cabinet ministers to the High Court, government sources said.
There are now concerns that a High Court ruling could bring up a confidence vote against the Speaker, who was an ally of President Yusuf until recently.
The East Africa country of Somalia has not had a functioning national government in nearly 18 years, but the Ethiopian-backed TFG has been in power since 2004.
The government collects taxes from key economic resources and is bankrolled by donor nations, mostly in the West.
But there is no reliable management of government funds, since the money is controlled by individuals and not institutions.